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Abstract. This is the first paper to address the topology structure of
Job Edge-Fog interconnection network in the perspective of network cre-
ation game. A two level network creation game model is given, in which
the first level is similar to the traditional network creation game with
total length objective to other nodes. The second level adopts two types
of cost functions, one is created based on the Jackson-Wolinsky type
of distance based utility, another is created based on the Network-Only
Cost in the IoT literature. We show the performance of this two level
game (Price of Anarchy). This work discloses how the selfish strategies
of each individual device can influence the global topology structure of
the job edge-fog interconnection network and provides theoretical foun-
dations of the IoT infrastructure construction. A significant advantage
of this framework is that it can avoid solving the traditional expensive
and impractical quadratic assignment problem, which was the typical
framework to study this task. Furthermore, it can control the system-
atic performance based only on one or two cost parameters of the job
edge-fog networks, independently and in a distributed way.
Keywords: Network Creation Game, Edge-Fog Computation, Internet
of Things
1 Introduction
By the year 2020, major technology companies expect that the number of con-
nected devices will be in the range of 25-50 billion. In particular, Cisco and
Ericsson believe that 50 billion devices will be reached by 2020 [1] [2]. The
Gartner Group on the other hand expects that number to be around 26 billion
[3]. Internet of Things (IoT) typically involves a large number of smart sensors
sensing information from the environment and sharing it to a cloud service for
processing. To tackle network issues involved in IoT and similar application com-
putation, researchers have proposed bringing the computing cloud closer to data
⋆
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generators and consumers. One proposal is Fog computing cloud [4] which lets
network devices run cloud application logic on their native architecture. One may
refer to the comprehensive survey on edge and fog computing [6]. Mohan and
Kangasharju [5] introduced a distributed Edge-Fog Cloud framework for IoT
computation. However, from the algorithmic point of view, it highly depends
on the quadratic assignment problem framework, which is very impractical. In
this paper, we give a new distributed framework which can avoid the quadratic
assignment problem.
1.1 Related Work
Network Creation Game Fabrikant et al. [7] formulated a well-studied game-
theoretic model of network creation. Given n agents (players), each one is corre-
sponding to a vertex. The network is created by laying down connections (egdes)
between vertices. The strategy of each agent v is to choose a subset of the ver-
tices Sv to be connected with. In this formulation, each edge may appear twice,
if v lays a connection to ω and ω also lays a connection to v. Let a non-negative
parameter α be the cost of making a connection. In this model, each agent de-
sires to be close to other agents, besides spending little for buying links. Thus
the total cost of each agent is defined as:
cost(v) = α |Sv|+
∑
ω
dist(v, ω),
where the sum is for all vertices in the created network and dist(v, ω) is the hop
distance between vertices v and ω, i.e. the number of edges on the shortest path
between the two vertices. If there is no path between v and ω, the hop distance
is infinity. Once a connection (link) is made in the network, all agents can use it
regardless who paid the construction cost. From the cost function, we can know
that on the one hand, each agent should pay some construction cost if he wants
to connect to other agents, on the other hand, he prefers to be close to other
nodes in the network.
Quadratic Assignment Problem In 1957, Koopmans and Beckmann first
introduced the quadratic assignment problem (QAP) as a mathematical model
for the locating a set of indivisible economical activities [8]. Later, Lawler [9] in-
troduced a more general version of the QAP, in which a four-dimensional array
of coefficients were given instead of the two matrices version in the Koopmans
and Beckmann paper. It is known that QAP is one of the most difficult opti-
mization problems. If n > 20, no algorithm is known with reasonable practical
computation time for finding an exact solution. With 30 nodes, even apply-
ing the advanced Kuhn-Munkres solver available from QAPLIB [10], it would
take more than one week to get the exact solution[5]. Sahni and Gonzalez [11]
proved that QAP is NP-hard. Furthermore, it is also inapproximable, in the
sense that it is impossible to find an ǫ-approximate solution in polynomial time,
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unless P=NP. Those results hold even when the Koopamans-Beckmann coeffi-
cient matrices satisfy the triangle inequality [12]. The dense linear arrangement
problem, which is a special case of the Koopmans-Beckmann QAP, a polynomial
time approximation scheme(PTAS) was found by Arora, Frieze and Kaplan [13].
There are also local search, SDP relaxations, ADMM, machine learning, spar-
sity as well as Gauss-Seidel decomposition based method etc. to study the QAP
[14][15][16][17][18].The reader is referred to the survey papers [19] [20] for more
information.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we propose a two level game model: edge-fog network creation
game and job edge-fog interconnection network creation game. In the edge-fog
network level, we adopt the traditional network creation game: SumGame; in
the job edge-fog interconnection network level, we play an assignment game, i.e.,
each job chooses fog and edge devices to connect, to minimize its own cost. We
consider the game-theoretic formation of interconnections between and within
two networks:
Edge-Fog network G1 = (V1, E1) and Job network G2 = (V2, E2). The Game
within the edge-fog network has n1 players {1, ..., n1}, this set is denoted by
[n1]. The strategy space of each player is the set Si = 2
[n1]−{i}. The job edge-
fog interconnection game has n2 players {1, ..., n2} in the set [n2]. The strategy
space of each player in job networks is the set Sj = 2
[n1]. Let γ(G) be the size
of Minimum Dominating Set. The total interconnection edges between G1 and
G2 is I := ∪jSvj . In this paper we assume n1 = n2.
The cost function for edge-fog player vi is defined to be
c(vi) = α |Svi |+
∑
ω∈G1(V )
dist(vi, ω).
The cost function for each job device vj is given in two different types of
games:
(Type I Game)
c1(vj) = β|Svj | −
1∑
ω∈G1(V )
dist(vj , ω)
(Type II Game)
c2(vj) = β|Svj |+
∑
ω∈G1(V )
dist(vj , ω)
Jackson and Wolinsky introduced [21] a canonical problem in network forma-
tion which involves distance based utilities. Based on this, Shahrivar and Sun-
daram [22] introduced the interconnection network creation game. The Type I
cost function in this paper is more specific.
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In this paper, in the Type II game, we consider about the Network-Only
Cost (NOC) [23] for each job device. Assume that each job device can connect
to more than one edge-fog device, and each edge-fog device can process several
job devices. We also assume that the number of edge-fog devices and the number
of job devices are the same. In case there are more job devices than edge-fog
devices, we can split the existing edge-fog devices into virtual devices so that
their number becomes equal to the number of jobs. Otherwise, the superfluous
devices can be ignored.
3 Best Response Strategies
Definition 1. [24] [25] Best response is the strategy (or strategies) which pro-
duces the most favorable outcome for a player, taking other players’ strategies
as given.
Theorem 1. [7] It is NP-hard for each edge-fog player to find the best response
strategy.
Theorem 2. It is NP-hard for each job player to find the best response strategy
(for both game types).
Proof. A dominating set for a graph G = (V,E) is a subset D of V such that
every vertex not in D is adjacent to at least one member of D. It is well known
that the Minimum Dominating Set problem is NP-complete(it is among Karp’s
original 21 NP-Complete problems [26]). It is easy to show that the best response
strategy is in NP as it is verifiable in polynomial time for a given strategy. Next,
we show a polynomial time many to one reduction from the Minimum Dominat-
ing Set problem to the best response strategy of job player. When β > 1, buying
an edge is more expensive than the edge distance(as the graph is unweighted, ev-
ery graph edge has length 1), thus each job player prefers to connect to minimum
number of vertices of G1 with a relatively small total distance to all vertices of
G1. Thus the best strategy would be to connect smallest number of vertices of
G1 to make sure that the distance from this job player to other vertices of G1
which are not directly connected to is 2. Making more connections would only
increase the total distance. Hence the cost is minimized when the vertices of G1
which the job player connects to form the Minimum Dominating Set of G1.
4 Nash Equilibrium and Price of Anarchy
In Game Theory, the most beautiful fundamental concept is Nash Equilibrium,
invented by Nobel Prize laureate John Forbes Nash Jr.[28].
Definition 2. Nash Equilibrium is under which no agent can reduce its cost
by unilaterally changing its strategy, if others remain in the same strategy.
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Nash also proved the existence of Nash Equilibrium in n player game with
mixed strategies in the same paper [28], using the Kakutani fixed-point theorem
(Note: The Kakutani fixed-point theorem is a min-max type result; a variant
was also obtained by the Brouwer fixed-point theorem in the 1951 paper of Nash
[27]). It is known that computing the Nash Equilibrium belongs to the com-
plexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs) [29][30],
which belongs to the TFNP class defined by Christos Papadimitriou [31] – the
complexity class of function problems that always guarantee the existence of the
solution for NP search problems.
In graph or network based game, we can also define the Network Structure
Equilibrium, as follows:
Definition 3. Network Structure Equilibrium is the stable state of the net-
work in which no player has the incentive to change its connections.
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) [32] is a concept in economics and game theory
that measures how the efficiency of a system degrades due to selfish behavior of
its agents.
Definition 4. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is the ratio of the maximum
social cost incurred by any Nash Equilibrium and the minimum possible social
cost incurred by any tuple of strategies.
The Nash equilibrium for edge-fog network is well studied in the literature.
One can find the state of the art list of exiting results in [33]. In this paper, we
mainly focus on the second level game.
The social welfare of edge-fog network is the total cost of both edge and fog
devices in this network. Its social welfare function is as follows:
c(G1) =
∑
i
ci = α|E|+
∑
i,j
dG1(i, j)
Based on the two types of utility functions, the following two cost functions
of the job network can be obtained.
(Type I Game)
c1(G2) =
∑
j
cj = β
∑
j
|Svj | −
∑
j
1∑
ω∈G1
dist(vj , ω)
(Type II Game)
c2(G2) =
∑
j
cj = β
∑
j
|Svj |+
∑
j
∑
ω∈G1
dist(vj , ω)
Based on the fact that every pair of vertices not connected to each other
by an edge is at least distance 2 away from each, [7] obtains a lower bound for
c(G1).
6 Rupei Xu, Andra´s Farago´, Jason P. Jue
c(G1) ≥ α|E| + 2|E|+ 2(n(n− 1)− 2|E|)
= 2n(n− 1) + (α− 2)|E|.
Similarly, we can get the obivious lower bound for c1(G2) and c2(G2).
4.1 Type I Game
Lemma 1. (Reverse Cauchy-Schwarz Ineqaulity) There exists a constant c > 0,
for 0 < ai < U, i = 1, ..., n,
n∑
i=1
1
ai
≤ cU
2n2∑n
i=1 ai
.
Theorem 3. The lower bound function of social cost for job network for type I
game is β|I| − 4cn42n2−|I| .
Proof. Based on the fact that every pair of vertices not connected to each other
between G1 and G2 are at least 2 away from each other. The job players buy
|I| edges with a total cost β|I|. Each vertex of G1 connect to G2 is 1 away from
the corresponding vertex of G2, other vertices of G1 not connect to G2, are at
least 2 away from the corresponding vertices of G2, thus this part the distance
related cost is −∑j 1|Svj |+2(n−|Svj |) . Put the two parts together, one can get the
following inequality:
c1(G2) ≥ β|I| −
∑
j
1
|Svj |+ 2(n− |Svj |)
= β|I| −
∑
j
1
(2n− |Svj |)
≥ β|I| − c(2n)
2n2∑
j(2n− |Svj |)
= β|I| − 4cn
4
2n2 − |I| .
(1)
In this type of game, c1(G2) is an unimodal function, which has a unique
minimum value. Take the deravitive, one can get
c′1(G2) = β −
4cn4
(2n2 − |I|)2 .
Let c′1(G2) = 0, then |I| = 2n2(1−
√
c
β
).
The social optimum is obtained in the saddle point. Thus
c∗1(G2) = 2βn
2(1−
√
c
β
)− 4cn
4
2n2 − 2n2(1−
√
c
β
)
= 2n2(β − 2
√
cβ).
Job Edge-Fog Interconnection Network Creation Game in Internet of Things 7
Theorem 4. When 0 < β ≤ 1, the job network PoA in Type I game is at most
1
2−4
√
c
β
.
Proof. When 0 < β ≤ 1, the Nash Equilibrium is a complete graph between
the vertices of G1 and G2. As the cost of buying one edge is less than the edge
distance 1, players would buy the most to make their total cost minimum.
The corresponding PoA is as follows:
PoA =
βn2 − 1
2n2(β − 2√cβ) ≤
βn2
2n2(β − 2√cβ) =
β
2(β − 2√cβ) =
1
2− 4
√
c
β
.
Theorem 5. When β > 1, the job network PoA in Type I game is at least
γ(G1)
2n(1− 2
√
c
β
)
.
Proof. When β > 1, in Nash Equilibrium, the corresponding vertices of G1
connected to I is the minimum dominating set of G1. The cost of each player in
Nash Equilibrium is
c(vj) ≥ βγ(G1)− 1
γ(G1) + 2(n− γ(G1))
Thus the corresponding PoA is:
PoA ≥
βγ(G1)n− n2n−γ(G1)
2n2(β − 2√cβ) ≥
βγ(G1)
2n(β − 2√cβ) =
γ(G1)
2n(1− 2
√
c
β
)
.
4.2 Type II Game
Theorem 6. The lower bound function of social cost for job network in type II
game is 2n2 + (β − 1)|I|.
Proof. Based on the fact that every pair of vertices not connected to each other
between G1 and G2 are at least 2 away from each other. The job players buy
|I| edges with a total cost β|I|. Each vertex of G2 connect to G1 is 1 away from
the connected vertices of G2, this part the total distance is |I|. Other vertices
in G1 not connect to G2, are at least 2 away from the corresponding vertices in
G2, thus this part the total ditance is 2(n
2 − |I|). Add the three parts together,
one can get the following inequality:
c2(G2) ≥ β|I|+ |I|+ 2(n2 − |I|)
= 2n2 + (β − 1)|I|.
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Theorem 7. When 0 < β ≤ 1, the job network PoA in Type II game is 1.
Proof. When 0 < β ≤ 1, the social optimum is when |I| is maximized, i.e., every
vertex of G2 is connected to every vertex of G1. Thus the social optimum is
c∗2(G2) = 2n
2 + (β − 1)n2 = (β + 1)n2. The Nash Equilibrium in this case is
represented by a complete graph between the vertices of G1 and G2. As buying
one connection edge is cheaper than the edge distance 1, one would like to buy
the most to make the total cost least.
The corresponding price of anarchy is
PoA =
(βn+ n)n
(β + 1)n2
= 1.
Theorem 8. When 1 < β ≤ 2, the job network PoA in Type II game is 1.
Proof. When 1 < β ≤ 2 the social optimum is obtained when |I| is minimized,
i.e., the vertices of G1 that connected to G2 vertices form a minimum dominating
set of G1.
The worst Nash Equilibrium is also obtained when |I| is minimized, as the
same with the social optimum.
Because the cost of each edge is larger than the edge distance cost 1, buying
one connection edge only decreases the distance of one pair vertices by 1 if the
original distance between them is 2, but add β > 1 cost to the total.
The corresponding price of anarchy is 1:
PoA =
2n2 + γ(G1)(β − 1)
2n2 + γ(G1)(β − 1) = 1.
Theorem 9. When S < β ≤ S + 1, where S ≥ 3, the job network PoA in Type
II game is at most S2 + 1.
Proof. If the original distance of one pair of vertices betweenG1 andG2 is greater
or equal to S ≥ 3, buying one connection edge cost β ≥ 2, the distance would
decreased by S − 1 ≥ 2, then the players would like to buy edges to make sure
each pair of vertices between G1 and G2 is less than or equal to 2. Otherwise if
β > S − 1, then in the Nash Equilibrium, players would buy smallest number of
edges to make sure the distance of each pair of vertices between G1 and G2 is
less than or equal to S.
The corresponding price of anarchy is:
Job Edge-Fog Interconnection Network Creation Game in Internet of Things 9
PoA ≤ β|I|+ |I|+ S(n
2 − |I|)
2n2 + γ(G1)(β − 1)
=
(β + 1− S)|I|+ Sn2
2n2 + γ(G1)(β − 1)
≤ (β + 1− S)n
2 + Sn2
2n2 + γ(G1)(β − 1)
=
(β + 1)n2
2n2 + γ(G1)(β − 1)
≤ (β + 1)
2
≤ S
2
+ 1.
(2)
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
This is the first paper to address the topology structure of Job Edge-Fog inter-
connection network from the perspective of network creation game. A two level
network creation game framework was developed. The analysis results show that,
cleverly control the cost parameters of each player would lead the worst Nash
Equilibrium very also or even exactly equal to the social optimum. This research
opens a door to study the complicated job edge-fog interconnection network in
an efficient distributed way.
There are some open problems left that are worth mentioning:
(1) In this model, we consider the total length (sum of path lengths) in the
cost function. This reflects an average case view. If the total length is replaced
by the maximum length, to reflect a worst case view, what can be shown about
the performance?
(2) In the social welfare functions, the interconnection cost has overlaps with
the internal connection structure of edge-fog network. One may give a more
accurate function to measure the social welfare, i.e., how the relationship of α
and β influences the two level network creation game performance?
(3) In this framework, we only consider the network with distance based
utility functions. As a refinement, one may also consider job process related
issues in edge-fog devices. Then the processing time and job distribution would be
important factors to analyze the performance of the job edge-fog interconnection
network.
(4) One may also develop other models rather than game theoretic framework
to study the topology structure of job edge-fog interconnection networks.
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